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If governments of India had wanted to maximize the
country's national product, they would have defied the
industrialists' demand for protection; overriden the
industrial workers' preference for security of employ-
ment; rejected the rich farmers' demands for limits to
land reform and agricultural taxation and low prices for
inputs and high prices for their output; and ignored the
requests from poorer regions for investment and
spending (Datta-Chaudhuri 1990:37). If Indian
governments had actually decided to maximize the
national product, however, and had resisted these
requests, they might not have stayed in government for
long. Or, as Mrs Gandhi actually did think of doing in
the 1970s, they would have had to change the rules of
rule. They could not have left the country as a coalition
of interests negotiating with each other on the
understanding that no one would act irremediably to
disable any of the others. What makes issues like this
issues of politics and not issues of another kind about
how best to allocate scarce resources for agreed ends
under agreed constraints, or about how most effectively
to execute an agreed decision, is that they necessarily
have no best answer. The point is elementary. Yet those
who think in terms of optimal paths to optimal
outcomes and assess the actions of governments
accordingly do not see it (Bardhan 1984 and more
generally Krueger 1990). And those who make the
distinction between 'government' and 'governance',
between the capacity to get things done with authority
and the capacity simply to get them done (Czempiel
1992:250), seem simply to evade it. In any society with
any degree of economic complexity, there will be a
number of different and usually conflicting interests. If
these are within acceptable bounds, that is to say if their
realization would not inflict unreasonable harm on
others; if none rests on misinformation or misunder-
standing, such that if those whose interest it is were to
know better (to know that to pursue it would be self-
defeating or would defeat other interests which they
held to be more important, or came to see that it was an
interest which they'd come to hold under conditions
they would not themselves now assent to) they would
change it or abandon it; and if we assume that there are
no 'real interests', interests which can be shown by all
rational parties to be true or false; then there will be no
good grounds for rejecting any (Geuss 1981). Many
governments, though, do reject some. Indeed, it is
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difficult to think of a government anywhere which does
not reject any.
There are two reasons for this, which between them
explain why it is that the questions of politics can have
no settled answer. The first is that there is no single best
solution in social choice. Some interests always have to
suffer. The second is that even if there could be such a
solution, no government would always be able to enact
it. All states aspire to be sovereign, and some of the
demands of sovereignty will always clash with some of
the things that some of the citizens want. Sovereignty is
in part an internal matter, of ensuring the citizens'
security and having the power to impose what that
security demands, and in part an external matter, of
ensuring the security of the state itself against threats
from others. It is not clear in what sense a state can
properly be said to be sovereign if it cannot do both
these things. Yet if it cannot be sovereign, it is not clear
that it can meet the minimum condition for being a
modern state.2 In all such states, therefore, there is a
necessary tension between what the citizens want and
the demands of the state itself.
This is why from 4th century Athens to 18th century
Scotland it was a commonplace of political thinking
that security, the security of persons, property, and the
state itself, required at best a mixed constitution.
Democracy was thought to be too great a risk. This
conclusion, most would now argue, was unduly
pessimistic. Modern representative democracies have
been reasonably successful in guaranteeing the security
of most of their citizens for most of the time. Few have
had to face implacable demands by the property-less
against the propertied. And most democracies have
been good at respecting each other's integrity (Doyle
1983). But this is because they have at best been
representative democracies. Rule by the people
themselves is impossible to sustain, and is everywhere
replaced by rule that is electively derived from them.
And in so far as electively derived rulers in what we call
democracies can be said to represent, they do so, as the
old American distinction used to have it, 'virtually'
rather than 'actually' (Wood 1992). Democracy is
everywhere elective aristocracy (Manin forthcoming).
What we now describe as 'representative democracy is
democracy made safe for the modern state: democracy
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converted from unruly and incoherent master' or so it
once was feared 'to docile and dependable servant'
(Dunn 1992:248).
In so far as 'good government' means 'good politics'
and not just 'good governance' - the capacity to get
some particular thing done - there can therefore be no
settled answer to what it consists of. Any answer will
depend upon which interests are thought important
and upon judgements about how best, constitutionally
and institutionally, to satisfy the ones that are.
International bankers will have one set of interests; aid
donors will have another; the guardians of the state will
have yet another; and the citizens will have others
again. It would seem to be true, and would seem also to
be final, that the answer to the question of 'good
government', in so far as it is not simply resolved by
who has the power to impose their interests on those of
others, will merely depend on what one's own interest
in government happens to be.
This conclusion, however, is too simple. It is the
conclusion to an argument which starts from the
assumption that one should proceed in politics by
considering interests as preferences, calculating on the
basis of these preferences what utility or consequence
to pursue, and if there is the causal knowledge and the
practical capacity, deciding what then to do. This
assumption, however, the assumption of what is often
loosely called 'utilitarianism', of what can more
precisely be described as 'sum-welfare con-
sequentialism', is questionable (Sen and Williams
1982). To rely solely on expressed preferences quite
apart from the well-known difficulties that arise in
trying to weigh and aggregate them can lead one to
overlook the fact that these are 'shifting and
endogenous rather than exogenous, and as a result are a
function of current information, consumption patterns,
legal rules, and general social pressures', and are not
prior to politics (Sunstein 1991:10). In concentrating
on the consequences of preferences rather than on the
question of for whom they are the consequences they
are, a sum-welfare consequentalism can lead one to
overlook or even override the identities and integrities
of the entities, individuals, groups and whole nations
whose welfare is at issue. And in its assumption that a
single incontestable decision can be taken with the use
of purely technical procedures, perhaps through an
accurate survey and summation of the preferences, it
reveals by an informed central power, a sum-welfare
consequentialism pre-empts the question of what kind
of politics it requires. It can also lead one to overlook
the question of which preferences are the proper
province of government and which are not.
The standard alternative to such consequentialism is a
contractualism (Scanlon 1982). There have been and
continue to be many suggestions for what the terms of a
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social contract should be. If we are thinking about the
good government of modern states, we can start from
the presumption that their rationale is to maximize the
benefits of social co-operation. That is to say, the
reason for having states at all, and the standard by
which we might now assess them, not the way in which
we might explain them, is that they can do what
individuals and the institutions of 'civil society'
severally or together may want to do but by themselves
cannot. A state which obstructs more than it facilitates
is accordingly bad; one which facilitates more than it
obstructs is not necessarily. In the modern world, as
distinct from that of the late l640s and early 1650s,
when the idea of the modern state can be said to have
crystallized (Skinner 1989), states are standardly
expected to provide not only for the security of their
subjects against attack from each other and from other
states, but also to furnish the conditions in which its
citizens can maximize their well-being (Dasgupta
1990). It is these conditions, of security and well-being
more generally, that we can expect any modern state to
try to maximize.
A modern contractualism would also be pluralist. It
would reject prior conceptions of the good, or people's
expressed preferences for one or another substantive
outcome, in favour of conceptions of what has been
described as 'the right'. In Sen's now familiar way of
putting it, it would not be concerned with realizing
particular levels of wealth or with supplying particular
sets of commodities or with satisfying particular sets of
utilities or actual or revealed preferences; it would not
concern itself with these or other things as ends. It
would concern itself rather with means, with people's
'capability' to 'function', to meet the minimum
standards of human decency and beyond that, to go on
to realize, within acceptable and practicable limits,
whatever ends or goods they wish to realize (Sen 1987).
It would also insist that not all components of the
standard of living, or well-being, or whatever one wants
to call it, can sensibly be the province of the state; for
the purposes of public policy, it would say, the standard
of living consists only of those components 'the
enhancement of which would be the appropriate
subject of a social contract between individuals wishing
to share the benefits of social co-operation' (Seabright
n.d.: 9, 13). Acknowledging pluralism, such a
contractualism concludes that to the best of its ability,
in the circumstances in which it finds itself, a
government has an obligation not actually to decide
what the appropriate standard of living or any other
substantive good or outcome is, and then to work
towards it, but to provide the rights, entitlements and
empowerments with which its citizens can themselves
decide and act effectively to realize whatever it is that
they want to realize.
Such a contractualism is not, of course, without its own
internal difficulties. There is the question of the time
period over which 'the benefits of social co-operation'
are to be considered; the question of what the desirable
rights or entitlements and empowerments are, and of
how they might be guaranteed; the question of what in
general in modern societies and in any particular case is
to be included in 'the standard of living' and what the
actual standard should be; the question of which
components of this standard, and which other rights
and entitlements, are 'appropriately' a matter of
implicit contract between the state and its citizens; and
the question of how to decide between those rights and
entitlements which conflict. Moreover, the line
between the consequentialist and contractualist
positions itself is not sharp. What rights, entitlements
and empowerments are thought desirable will turn in
part on what the consequences of the citizens' being
able to exercise them are thought to be. Moreover, if
the desirability of this or that right depends on what
these consequences will be, and if these consequences
conflict, as they are likely to do in a plural society, then
the rights and entitlements (and by extension the
empowerments too) will also, as Dasgupta puts it, have
to be 'traded' (Dasgupta 1990). Contractualism does
not do away with questions of politics.
Nonetheless, it does avoid the objections to sum-
welfare consequentialism. It also provides a criterion
with which to decide how good governments are. This
is, simply, whether they are acting to maximize the
benefits of social co-operation. In political theory, this
has usually been used as a criterion with which citizens
can assess their own government. But it can also be
extended by one government, or by an analogous
institution, like the World Bank or the United Nations,
to assess another. If our confrontation with another
government is purely notional, and is not a real relation,
the decision will be private, and have no public
purchase. If however the relation is real - that is to say
if we, whoever we are, have a relation with another state
in which what that state does has consequences for us as
well as its citizens - this will not be so.
Consider the example of the relation between a donor
and a Third World state. This could be seen in at least
three ways. In the first, the donor can be seen to have a
relation with the state as regime, that is to say, with
those who direct it. In this case, if those in office in the
regime in question accept the conditions that the donor
imposes, fine; and if not, not. In the second, the donor
can be seen to have a relation with the regime as the
representative of the citizens of the state. In this case, if
the citizens are in favour of the suggested conditions,
fine; and if not, not. In the third, the donor can be seen
to have a relation with the state in question as the
agency which has a contract to maximize the benefits of
co-operation in its territory. In this case, if no-one,
donor, government or citizens, can reasonably reject
the claim that the donor's conditions satisfy this
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criterion, then fine; but if any of them can, then the
donor's conditions have to be reconsidered.
This is, as it stands, very general. And it obviously does
not remove the need for complex and particular
judgements. But it does discriminate. All international
financial institutions, like the IMF, and some
multilateral donors, like the World Bank, have been
concerned entirely with outcomes, have had a clear idea
of how the outcome that matters to them might be
achieved, and have tried to avoid questions of politics.
They have been straightforwardly consequentialist.
(This is why they like to talk of 'governance'.). But in
their relations with a recipient they have come to see
themselves as entering a contract. This is financially to
support a government if and only if, with due allowance
for slippage, that government agrees to implement a
specific set of policies. This is a contract of the first of
the three kinds I have mentioned, a contract with the
government, in effect with the economic ministries,
rather than with the citizens or with the state as the
maximizer of social co-operation between the citizens.
Other multilateral donors, like the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and many
bilaterals, like the French government in Africa in the
later 1980s, have been concerned with outcomes that
are pursued under more explicitly political conditions.
('In contributing to economic progress and recon-
struction', states the first chapter of the agreement
setting up the EBRD, 'the purpose of the Bank shall be
to foster the transition towards open, market-oriented
economies and to promote private and entrepreneurial
initiative in Central and Eastern European countries
committed to and applying the principles of multi-
party democracy, pluralism and market economics'.)
This is a contract of the second kind, with governments
as representatives of their citizens. Or at least, it is a
contract of this second kind unless there is a further and
unstated assumption that social co-operation within
any state can only be maximized if the politics through
which the government of that state holds power is of a
particular kind. If there is such an assumption, it is a
contract of the third kind.
If it is a contract of the second kind, however, then it is
not well grounded. The citizens' preferences, I have
argued, are not paramount. If, on the other hand, it is a
contract of the third kind, it is unacceptably pre-
emptive. It is perfectly possible that neither the
government of a state nor a majority of that state's
citizens believes that the benefits of social co-operation
are in fact best served by a competitive multi-party
democracy. And it is perfectly possible that they could
be right in that belief. This has arguably been so in the
recent past. Mobutu, for instance, like some other
African presidents, has always claimed that to allow a
competitive multi-party democracy in Zaire would be
to licence disorder. The claim may now be strained like
Moi's in Kenya in the early 1990s; it has certainly been
self-serving, but in the years after the civil war in
Congo-Kinshasa between 1960 and 1965, it was not
self-evidently false. Likewise, the factional disputes
within Chang's Democratic Party in South Korea in
1960 and 1961, and his consequent inability to form
stable cabinets and govern effectively, made it easier for
Park Chung Hee and Kim Jong Pi! to justify and
consolidate the coup against him which they'd initially
planned against Syngman Rhee before Rhee and the
First Republic fell (by other hands) in 1960. Exploiting
the discredit into which political competition had fallen
in Chang's Second Republic, and playing on fears of
renewed attack from the north, these officers made a
tacit bargain with South Koreans that they would
forsake an open democracy for security and prosperity.
It is of course possible now to argue that in each of these
two cases, the risks of a competitive electoral politics
were overstated. The conflict in Congo-Kinshasa was
exacerbated by the fact that at a hot moment in the Cold
War, the United States and the Soviet Union decided
to contest each other there. But when that conflict was
over and the Soviet Union had retreated, most
Congolese were impoverished and exhausted, and had
Mobutu been willing to share power, a competitive
democracy might have been peaceful. In their own
history before and after the Japanese occupation,
Koreans, like the Congolese before Leopold's Congo
Free State and the subsequent Belgian occupation, had
had little or no experience of competitive democracy
and the rules which it requires to work. But Chang did
manage to secure the redirection of economic policy on
which the subsequent success of Park and Kim's coup
depended, and it might in retrospect seem that there
was no reason why, with will and some skill, the
country could not, like de Gaulle's Fifth Republic at
the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s,
have implemented the new policy in the midst of
incipient civil war. These, however, are the judgements
of hindsight. It is much less easy persuasively to claim
that looking forward from Kinshasa in 1965 or from
Seoul in 1961, open political competition would have
been a rational choice. In each country, security, and
the authority of the state to provide it, were at a
premium, and such competitive democracy as there
had already been had turned into a self-defeating
shambles. Those who established the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development in 1990 pre-
sumably thought that the world had changed. After
1989, external threats to nation-states had all but
disappeared. Governments predicated on 'national
security', therefore, were no longer defensible. For
many parts of the world, including those countries in
Central and Eastern Europe which the European Bank
was set up to help, this may be correct. But internal
disorder or the real threat of such disorder is still
widespread in what was Yugoslavia, in republics in the
former Soviet Union, in Turkey, Iraq, India, Sri
Lanka, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Indonesia, in Peru,
and in Africa from Algeria to South Africa. If
Przeworski is correct, that democracy is about rules,
not outcomes, and that competing parties will only
accept defeat if they can be sure that the rules will stay
in place and give them a chance of victory in the future
(Przeworski 1991:1040); and if Schumpeter was right,
that such rules will only be accepted if there is
widespread agreement on the general shape and
direction of the society and if not too many issues are
politicized (Schumpeter 1950); then it may be asking
too much to expect many of those citizens who are
protesting against what their regimes are doing to them
to accept such rules.
Moreover, internal disorder is not always incidental to
economic development. In its earlier stages, which can
be prolonged, such development is notoriously uneven.
It can disproportionately benefit one sector, or class, or
gender, or region. It can also actively d»isbenefit others.
It can accordingly produce new discontents and
divisions. It can also itself be pursued, and often has
been, as a tacit civil war. It can require decisions about
how to allocate or more painfully reallocate existing
assets, new resources and immediate benefits. For this
reason, and because they have to be effective, often to
be long-term, these are not decisions that are always
best arrived at through open political competition or an
attempted compromise between existing interests.
They can be decisions that are better taken outside the
arenas of electoral contest altogether. But if it is
difficult reasonably to reject the claim that the
development in question makes sense, that is to say to
argue that in pursuing development in this way the
state is in the medium or long run not maximizing the
benefits of social co-operation, it may also not make
sense for donors to insist that a condition of continuing
to support it is that the government which is directing it
be 'democratic'. Drastic measures can require drastic
politics. The demands of financial stabilization and
structural adjustment, in which heads of state and
ministries of finance are asked by the donors to assume
exceptional powers, and by which the poor are
disadvantaged, but which are not everywhere and
always wholly unreasonable, are only the most recent
cases in point.3
Alternatively, it may be that even if formally
democratic, and so on the face of it acceptable to those
donors for whom constitutional democracy is a
desirable pre-condition, a regime is able to work its
constitution and exploit its other advantages in such a
way as to stay in power without effective opposition at
all. Yet on the maximization of co-operation criterion,
The exceptional powers are frankly explained by William Rhodes, banking community's response to the debt crisis of the l980s
who is now the vice-chairman of Citicorp and led the international (Rhodes 1992).
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the likely benefits of its rule to its citizens may be
sufficiently promising to justify external support
(Ascherson 1 992a, 1992b). This is what might be said of
some states now in Central and Eastern Europe, which
Ascherson has in mind; it might also be said of Mexico,
where despite the vigour of his other reforms, Salinas
still resists the pressure to open the ruling Party of the
Institutional Revolution to full political competition,
or of Vietnam, or Sri Lanka, or Ghana, indeed of a host
of Third World states; and it can certainly be said of
Italy at least until the early 1990s and of Japan still. And
if there is anything in the belief that a degree of
'development' is conducive to a more truly competitive
politics, such support may in time produce what is by
this standard a more acceptable set of political rules.
But suppose that it can reasonably be said that a regime
is not acting in such a way as to be maximizing the
benefits of social co-operation among its citizens, and
that it therefore fails this test of good government. On
what grounds could a donor then refuse aid, or insist
that if aid is to continue, the policies must change? It is
important to see that this is only a question either if it is
assumed that governments do adequately represent
their citizens and that the citizens' preferences are
sovereign, an assumption I have already questioned; or
if it is assumed that the sovereignty of states
themselves, as states, is sacred, and overrides all other
claims. This, in the world that was established in 1648,
has been a common argument. The delegates who met
in Westphalia then to negotiate the end of the religious
disputes of the Thirty Years War were clear and almost
unanimous: princes must be considered to be
absolutely sovereign over their territory, and could
have good reasons to go to war if and only if this
sovereignty was threatened. After almost exactly
another 300 years, in the course of which arguments
from nationalism and democracy had modified existing
defences for the internal authority of the state, the
authority of the prince or sovereign himself, or the
authority of what Hobbes in 1651 recast as the
impersonal sovereignty of the state itself, and in the
course of which existing justifications of empire had
been rejected by the United States and the Soviet
Union (and with the support of these two powers, by a
majority in the new United Nations), these old
arguments for the absolute sovereignty of states were
extended to make them arguments for the absolute
sovereignty of states-as-nations. The United Nations'
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960 put it plainly:
all 'peoples', it said, had a right to 'self-determination',
and no 'inadequacy of political, economic, social or
educational preparedness should. . . serve as a pretext
for delaying [their] independence'. Until then, all states
had been defined by force. Now, sovereignty was not
just a condition which, when successfully fought for,
had to be respected; it was also something that had to be
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conceded to those who, being nations, had a right to it.
On what grounds could anyone now override this
argument?
A conventional answer is, if a state is violating the
'human rights' of its citizens. There are two distinct
arguments for such an answer. The first and more
extreme is simply that a certain set of basic rights has
precedence over the claims of any state. The second is
that states have a duty to acknowledge these rights, and
that if they don't, they are breaking the implicit
contract they have with their citizens. This is more
consistent with what I have been arguing here. It is also
more practical. For against the first defence, there is the
simple fact that there is (as yet) no authority above all
states which has the power to enforce decisions on
them. (An International Court of Justice exists, but its
judgements are not binding.) For all the talk of
'international society', there are still at best associations
of states, like the United Nations itself and the
European Community, or institutions, like the World
Bank, in which individual states have the say (Mayall
1990). In practice, it is still only states which, severally
or together, can talk to and act on other states.
But why should states concern themselves with the
rights of other states' citizens? Once again, there seem
to be essentially two arguments. The first and more
general is an extension of the conclusion that was
reached in Westphalia in 1648. There, it was supposed
that states had a responsibility for the security of their
territories and the subjects in those territories. That
was the thought which Hobbes spelt out as ajustification for the new modern state's internal
authority. Now, more than 300 years later, it is widely
assumed that states have responsibilities beyond
security, and beyond extending the civil and political
rights of citizenship itself, to provide 'social rights'. In
the late 20th century, the argument is increasingly that
the right to rule implies a more extensive set of duties.
This is the kind of social contract that I have gestured at
here. In fact, of course, many states which fall down on
such duties, and also those which acknowledge that
others do, have an interest in inaction. It is one thing for
Brussels to press London on this matter, or for Paris to
press Cotonou. It is quite another for Beijing to support
action in the Security Council against Colombo's
treatment of the Sri Lankan Tamils, or for Moscow to
support action against Belgrade's treatment of ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo. To do so would be to hostage
their own future fortune. They will prefer to stay with
the principles of 1648. (It is also more difficult, as
donors privately acknowledge, to press an India or a
Brazil than it is to press a small African state.) This first
argument for states' concerning themselves with the
rights of citizens in other states, therefore, may be
morally persuasive, but in the existing Realpolitik of
relations between First World states and many within
the Third World, and of relations also between most
Third World states themselves, it will not have much
bite.
The second of the two arguments, however, could have.
States in their role as donors, and a fortiori the
international institutions whose raison d'étre is to be
donors, exist solely and explicitly to improve the
standard of living or well-being of the citizens of other
states. That's to say, on the line of thinking I have been
pursuing here, they exist to ensure that the social rights
of the citizens of these states, and those civil and
political rights without which these social rights as
claimable rights would be incomplete, are extended
and observed. States, in short, are assumed to have a
contract with their citizens to provide the best possible
conditions for an improvement in the standard of
living. Donors exist to improve the conditions for
improvements in standards of living. They can
accordingly be seen to put themselves under an
obligation to assist states which do their best to observe
this contract with their citizens, and to have reason to
argue with those which do not.
This conclusion has two attractions. In the first place, it
satisfies the intuition that donors, including states in
their role as donors, should not be indifferent to the
politics of the states whose citizens they exist to help,
yet sidesteps the strong support still for the
assumption, outdated though this may be, that no state,
as a state, should 'interfere in the internal affairs' of
another. Indeed, it is consistent with the thinking that
does now guide many donors. The economists in the
IMF and World Bank and elsewhere who argue that
states should spend less on inefficient production,
invest in the infrastructure, and do more to raise taxes;
those in the EBRD and the foreign ministries of some
Northern states who ask for fair and open elections; as
well, of course, as those negotiators who insist that
political prisoners be freed before aid is disbursed, are
not necessarily misguided. But they run the risk of
imposing their own particular interests, economic and
political, in circumstances where these may not be
appropriate, and of exciting aggravation where they
could avoid it. The attraction of the kind of contract I
have been suggesting here is that it can accommodate
these particular interests as long as they meet a wider
test: the test not of whether they are positively
acceptable to the recipient that is too strong, but of
whether, once the principle in the contract itself is
accepted, the relevant parties could not reasonably
reject them (Scanlon 1982; Nagel 1991).
This is the other attraction. The conclusion allows for a
great deal not reasonably to be rejected. This matters.
Not only is it unproven that the failures of government
always and everywhere outweigh failures of the market.
There are also radically different conceptions of just
what does count as maximizing the benefits of co-
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operation. The present impulse in thinking about 'good
government' for development comes from the United
States, and present conceptions of good government
reveal their origins (Kruger 1990). As I have said, the
American argument has been that everyone has their
particular interests, those of the citizens are sovereign,
and the actual representation of their particular
interests is the ideal. Hence the ideological attractions
of 'the market', in which it is supposed that each person
can pursue his or her interests without any mediation at
all. In politics, however, virtual representation is the
reality, and politicians and those who execute political
decisions must always therefore be suspected of
pursuing their own particular interests at the expense
of others. Such suspicion may often be justified, even if
the old American grounds for it, that politicians are just
one more set of citizens with particular interests, may
be too simple. In all other representative democracies,
however, virtual representation is accepted for what it
is, the tribute that the democratic aspiration pays to the
modern state. The state is presumed to have
information that the citizens do not, to be able to
interpret it in ways that the citizens cannot, and to be
able to act on it and to do so unless there is evidence to
the contrary in what it takes to be the common good.
Indeed, in many of these other democracies, not least
those now in East Asia, it would be thought absurd to
suppose that each citizen's interest, let alone the
interests of all, would best be served by devolving
decisions to them. It is taken for granted that the state
exists to maximize the benefits of co-operation or at
least, of co-ordination, and that without it, there would
be a radically sub-optimal disorder. In some other
cultures, it is true, including many in sub-Saharan
Africa, politics is seen in a different way, as a means of
enriching oneself and one's own people, and there has
been little or no conception of any wider good
(Hawthorn 1993). Here, the donors have more difficult
choices to make. But the pure types of modern
government - the actual rather than virtual
representation of all particular interests (urged in
Pennsylvania in the l780s); electoral competition
between the virtual representatives of one political class
which agrees on a mixed economy (Britain in the
1950s), factional competition within an effectively
uncontested party of virtual representatives in a
directed market economy (Japan since the late 1950s),
the use of office solely for personal gain (Zaire in the
1 980s, not to mention North Korea all through) are
rare. In most states now, including most of those in
sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the Third World,
there are elements of each. This second attraction of the
contractualist formulation is that it provides a criterion
of good government but allows many readings of what
that might actually consist. The onus is on the donors
reasonably to reject what the recipients suggest; not on
the recipients to agree that what the donors suggest is
acceptable.
Nonetheless, a question remains. What ifa regime can
reasonably be said not to be practising good
government, and refuses to change? Does the donor
then turn away, condemning the citizens to a bad
government which in the nature of the case they're
unlikely to be able to change? The harsh answer must
be yes. The argument I have made, and the distinction
I have used to make it - the distinction between states
as states and states (or associations of states) as donors
- allows no other conclusion. Only if we were to
inhabit a world in which this distinction marked no
difference - a world in which every state was assumed
not only to have a duty to provide security for its
citizens and respect the absolute sovereignty of every
other state, but also to extend civil, political and social
rights to its citizens; and in which it was agreed that any
government which did not meet this obligation was
justifiably subject to coercion by others - could we
argue for active intervention. Such a world would have
its attractions. It would be a world in which it was
agreed that what had been wrong with the civilizing
mission of European imperalism and its neo-
imperialist successors was not the idea of a civilizing
mission, but imperialism. The practice of development,
itself a civilizing mission of a more civilized kind, will
be incomplete so long as such interventions are not
accepted.
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